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Abstract
Ever since its foundations were laid nearly a century ago, quantum theory has pro-
voked questions about the very nature of reality. We address these questions by 
considering the universe—and the multiverse—fundamentally as complex patterns, 
or mathematical structures. Basic mathematical structures can be expressed more 
simply in terms of emergent parameters. Even simple mathematical structures can 
interact within their own structural environment, in a rudimentary form of self-
awareness, which suggests a definition of reality in a mathematical structure as sim-
ply the complete structure. The absolute randomness of quantum outcomes is most 
satisfactorily explained by a multiverse of discrete, parallel universes. Some of these 
have to be identical to each other, but that introduces a dilemma, because each math-
ematical structure must be unique. The resolution is that the parallel universes must 
be embedded within a mathematical structure—the multiverse—which allows uni-
verses to be identical within themselves, but nevertheless distinct, as determined by 
their position in the structure. The multiverse needs more emergent parameters than 
our universe and so it can be considered to be a superstructure. Correspondingly, its 
reality can be called a super-reality. While every universe in the multiverse is part of 
the super-reality, the complete super-reality is forever beyond the horizon of any of 
its component universes.
Keywords Reality · Super-reality · Multiverse · Mathematical structure · Emergent 
properties
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1  A First Approach to Reality
Philosophers have been arguing about reality and its interpretation since even before 
Plato and Aristotle. Physicists came late to the party, but they brought with them a 
heady brew—the quantum theory. One of its founders, Werner Heisenberg, wrote in 
(1958) that
“the idea of an objective real world whose smallest parts exist objectively in 
the same sense as stones or trees exist, independently of whether or not we 
observe them…is impossible.”
Quantum mechanics, which made predictions that could be physically tested, 
has even been interpreted by some as saying that reality depends upon human 
consciousness:
“The doctrine that the world is made up of objects whose existence is inde-
pendent of human consciousness turns out to be in conflict with quantum 
mechanics and with facts established by experiment”
d’Espagnat (1979)
In this paper, we are going to take the opposite view from physicist and philoso-
pher Bernard d’Espagnat: we shall claim that self-awareness is a product of an inde-
pendent reality rather than the other way around. In support of our position we shall 
describe heuristically how this might come about in Sect. 3.
In the meantime, to get straight to the point without being diverted by ontologi-
cal and epistemological discussions (for those, a good starting point might be Leifer 
2014), let us make a first attempt at a working definition of reality:
Reality (I) Reality is the complete set of quantum fields extending throughout the 
whole of spacetime that comprises our block universe.
Before going further, we need to unpack this definition to see if it works. The 
block universe may be thought of as the four-dimensional block of spacetime that 
encapsulates the complete past and future history of our universe. (The notion of the 
block universe, of course, has a respectable provenance, and, indeed, the block uni-
verse may even be demonstrated experimentally (McKenzie 2016b).) So, our defini-
tion is saying that reality is the complete past and future history of all of the quan-
tum fields that go to make up our universe. That must include all of the particles that 
arise from stable excitations of the appropriate quantum fields as well as all of their 
interactions.
Symbolically, the dependence of our universe U on quantum fields is
where i denotes the ith quantum field, φi, imax is the total number of quantum fields 
and the curly brackets represent the set.
A consequence of our definition of reality is that it cannot be expressed more 
fundamentally in terms of contemporary physics. For instance, if we were instead to 
(1)U =
{
휑i ∶ 1 ≤ i ≤ imax
}
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define reality in terms of just the fundamental particles of the Standard Model, then 
that definition would be open to the charge that the particles are themselves describ-
able as excitations of the appropriate quantum fields. On the other hand, if we try to 
extend our definition more deeply than the quantum fields, then all we are left with, 
like the grin on the Cheshire cat, is the essential pattern of the quantum fields. There 
are straws in the wind that the patterns of quantum fields and their interactions may 
be further reducible into yet more fundamental patterns (see, for instance, Arkani-
Hamed et al. 2014) but there is no hint of any return to stuff—it’s patterns all the 
way down!
2  Philosophical Aspects of Accepting a Mathematical Stratum 
as the Fundamental Level of Reality
Patterns, of course, are just mathematical structures, but, at least for some in the 
physics community, it seems to be less provocative to claim that the universe is, fun-
damentally, a pattern rather than to say that it is a mathematical structure.
It may be easier to accept that the fundamental level of our reality is a mathemati-
cal structure by asking how, in a Theory of Everything, we might explain our uni-
verse, particularly including space and time itself. Clearly, our explanation cannot 
depend upon any property of the universe that involves space or time, since that is 
what we are trying to explain. A pure mathematical structure satisfies this require-
ment. This is well illustrated, for example, in papers by physicists who attempt to 
model the emergence of spacetime: their approach is to start with an abstract (quan-
tum) mathematical structure in Hilbert space and thence demonstrate the emergence 
of gravity. Since gravity is a property of the (general relativistic) structure of space-
time, they are effectively demonstrating the emergence of spacetime itself (see, for 
example, ChunJun et al. 2017; Raasakka 2017).
This will be one of the claims of our paper, that our reality is purely a mathemati-
cal structure. To that extent, at least, we are in agreement with Tegmark (2008). We 
shall see at the end of Sect. 5 that such a philosophy, which is, in essence, one of 
ontic structural realism (Berghofer 2018), makes it easier to accept the idea of paral-
lel universes, because a pattern (a universe) may be duplicated without controversy.
In spite of the above, many people harbour the suspicion that, no matter how 
sophisticated a mathematical structure we may conjecture, that structure can never 
be more than a mere description of reality, rather than reality itself. For these peo-
ple, we have not breathed fire into the equations. They find it hard to accept that their 
own self-awareness can be just a mathematical structure. So goes their argument, 
along lines reminiscent of Dr Johnson’s refutation of Bishop Berkeley’s immaterial-
ist philosophy by kicking a stone and feeling the reverberation in his body.
The next section is essentially a response to that argument as well as to that of 
d’Espagnat, who, as we saw in Sect. 1, did not accept the independence of reality 
from human consciousness. We shall show that a simple mathematical structure can, 
in principle, demonstrate an awareness of itself. The structure that we use will also 
serve later in our discussion of super-reality in “Appendix 1”.
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3  How a Simple Mathematical Structure Can in Principle be 
Self‑aware
It is easy to see why many physicists reject such a statement. While they may accept 
that our universe can be described by mathematics, it is seemingly a step too far to 
think that it can be mathematics. Nevertheless, a case can be argued to make that 
idea more palatable by considering a version of a two-dimensional cellular automa-
ton, Conway’s Game of Life (Gardner 1970), in which, as we shall see, there can be 
a structure that is “aware” of its environment. (It is sometimes helpful to use such 
automata rather than to appeal to our own subjective experience as self-aware beings 
in our own universe, with all of the associated baggage that such experience would 
entail.).
The main attraction of the Game of Life is that its very simple set of rules can 
lead to solutions of interesting complexity. The game evolves within a two-dimen-
sional (p, q) matrix, the cells of which live or die, and it is typically played out on a 
computer monitor screen which displays successive generations (labelled h) of the 
matrix. The pattern in any generation (generation h) is transformed according to the 
rules, and the resulting pattern is then displayed as the next (h + 1) generation. Prag-
matically, the matrix is finite in extent which means that boundary conditions (for 
instance, toroidal) must be chosen.
The rules are that (1) a live cell with either two or three live neighbours (formally 
called the Moore neighbourhood) will live on to the next generation but will die 
otherwise and (2) a dead cell with exactly three live neighbours will become alive 
in the next generation. Symbolically, in each generation h, we can assign to each 
cell, (p, q) , a state State(p, q, h) , which takes the value 1 if the cell is live and 0 if it 
is dead. At the beginning of the game, when h = 0, the pattern—a boundary condi-
tion—is specified for every cell in the starting matrix: State(p, q, 0) . The patterns of 
successive generations are then found from:
where
The parameter N is the number of live neighbours surrounding a central cell. In 
(3), the value of the central cell’s state is subtracted from the double summation 
because that value should not be included in the total, which is supposed to include 
only neighbouring states.
The complete pattern of the Game-of-Life block universe may be reconstructed 
from algorithms (2) and (3), given the state of all of the cells in the matrix at the 
beginning of the game. Notice that the pattern and the algorithms are isomorphic—
they are the same mathematical structure.
(2)
State (p, q, h + 1) =
{
1 if N(p, q, h) ≤ 3 and (3 − State(p, q, h) ≤ N(p, q, h))
0 otherwise
(3)N(p, q, h) =
{
p+1∑
a=p−1
q+1∑
b=q−1
State(a, b, h)
}
− State(p, q, h)
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An example of how the Game of Life works, based on a simple 7 × 7 matrix, is 
given in Fig. 1, which shows a starting position at generation h and the subsequent 
four generations. In each matrix, the value of N is shown for each of the 49 cells. 
The pattern in this figure is a “glider” [discovered by the British mathematician, 
Richard Guy (Roberts 2015)], which progresses diagonally across the matrix, com-
pleting the cycle in four steps.
To emphasise the block-universe nature of the structure, these same five matrices 
are displayed in Fig. 2, stacked in order of successive generations with the starting 
pattern at the bottom.
Remarkably, for structures based upon such a simple algorithm, the Game of 
Life can support a Universal Turing Machine (UTM) as was first shown by Rendell 
(2014). The elements of his UTM are shown in Fig. 3. It consists of the rectangu-
lar “programmable machine”, and a stack that contains both the program and the 
input data for the program. The stack is diagonal because it relies upon, among other 
objects, many copies of the diagonally-moving glider depicted in Figs. 1 and 2. With 
a little licence, one can envisage such a UTM sending probes around its neighbour-
hood and thereby constructing an internal representation of its matrix environment. 
When this environment includes itself, then, in a rudimentary sense, we might say 
that the UTM is self-aware.
If a Game-of-Life player were to pause the execution of a program that 
included such a “self-aware” UTM and then re-start it at a later time, the UTM 
Fig. 1  A “glider” in the Game of Life moves downwards and to the right in a cycle of four generations. 
“Live” cells are shown in black; dead cells are in white. The number in each cell is the number, N, of live 
neighbours surrounding the cell
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would obviously be unaware that the program had been temporarily interrupted. 
This is to be distinguished from the situation where we build a robot in our labo-
ratory which is aware of its environment, switch it off and then re-start it. Our 
robot would be aware that it had been temporarily switched off because its envi-
ronment, such as the laboratory clock, would have changed state while it was 
unconscious. In the scenario with the Game of Life being paused, however, it is 
the UTM’s complete universe that is temporarily halted.
Fig. 2  This highlights the block-
universe nature of the Game of 
Life shown in Fig. 1
Fig. 3  A Universal Turing Machine (UTM) implemented on the Game of Life. Drawing adapted from 
Rendell (2009)
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This simple scenario is intended to illustrate the independence of the pattern—that 
is, the mathematical structure—of the Game-of-Life block universe from the computer 
programs that simulate it. It is important to appreciate that the UTM in our Game of 
Life does not spring into self-awareness when the program is started up: the self-aware-
ness of the UTM is a property of the pattern of the particular Game-of-Life block uni-
verse in which it finds itself. Its self-awareness is completely independent of the simu-
lation, which has no self-awareness.
Notice, too, that the pattern for the block universe is unique: simulations of it by dif-
ferent computers are different simulations, but they are simulations of a unique math-
ematical structure. In the same way, there may be different simulations of a sphere on 
different computers, but the structure that they are simulating (x2 + y2 + z2 = constant) is 
unique.
4  Emergent Parameters in a Simple Mathematical Structure
It may be argued that the structure for the Game-of-Life block universe and that for 
a sphere do not themselves create the three dimensions of the worlds in which their 
patterns operate. In other words, some may argue that these mathematical structures 
can only exist by virtue of our own universe, which provides the requisite geometry, 
and that these mathematical structures are therefore not independent of our universe. 
However, that perception arises because we used the labels h, x, y and z, which are sug-
gestive of our own geometry, for convenience. Fundamentally, there are no labels, only 
patterns.
As a simple illustration of this, take the elementary mathematical structure which is 
the binary representation of the number 33874822719. This number is expressed in 35 
binary digits:
While there is clearly a pattern within these bits, it is not a particularly “interesting” 
one. However, since 35 is the product of two prime numbers, the bits can be arranged, 
in the same order, in a 5 × 7 matrix:
This arrangement is hardly more interesting than the previous sequence. However, 
if the digits are arranged in the alternative 7 × 5 matrix, then a more coherent pattern 
emerges:
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1
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This pattern lends itself to simple descriptions such as “digits in the 7 × 5 matrix 
are “1” when they are on the perimeter and “0” otherwise”. So, in a Kolmogorov-
complexity sense (Li and Vitanyi 2008) it singles itself out as special. Hence, even 
in this crude example, without using labels, a dimensionality emerges from within 
the structure, rather than the other way around. We call the parameters that define 
the dimensionality (in this case, seven rows and five columns) emergent parame-
ters—these are defined in “Appendix 1”.
With the above discussion in mind, our definition of reality may now be refined:
Reality (II) Our reality is the complete mathematical structure of our block universe.
5  Fundamental Uncertainty Implies a Parallel‑Universe Model
Let us now look at some of the patterns within our block universe. We may be par-
ticularly struck by the outcomes of identical double-slit experiments, each using a 
single electron. We can arrange for these experiments to be distributed throughout 
our block universe, including experiments separated by space-like intervals (taking 
place at the same moment in widely separated laboratories) as well as experiments 
performed serially in the same laboratory. In each experiment, only a single electron 
is used, and we note the position of its interaction on the detector screen in every 
case.
When we look at the outcomes of a very large, but finite, number of experiments, 
it is clear that, while the position of the interaction on the screen in any single exper-
iment could not have been predicted (it is apparently random), there is nevertheless 
a pattern that connects the ensemble of outcomes. When the outcomes of each 
experiment are collected together and plotted on a frequency distribution graph 
across the detecting screen, the result is a sinc-squared term multiplied by a cosine-
squared term: 
(
sin 훽
훽
)2
cos2 훼 , where α and β are both functions of the distance across 
the detecting screen. We notice that this pattern matches the absolute square of the 
value of the probability amplitude along the detecting screen, which we can calcu-
late from the Lagrangians of the quantum electron field summed over time for all of 
the different trajectories from the slits to the screen.
We notice further that there is always one—and never more than one—interac-
tion between the quantum electron field and the detecting screen. This is surprising 
1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1
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because points on the screen are generally space-like separated: after all, if the 
screen is sufficiently far from the double slits, then the detecting area would have 
to be kilometres wide. Our surprise stems from the fact that we already noticed that 
disturbances in quantum fields transmit at a finite speed, so that there is no way 
for information about an interaction at one point on the screen to be relayed by the 
quantum field to the other parts of the screen to prevent a duplicate interaction.
Figure 4 shows two possible positions for the electron to be detected at the screen. 
The most important point illustrated in this figure is that the quantum electron field 
(and all of the other quantum fields which have no significant bearing on this par-
ticular experiment) is the same at the instant at which the electron is detected, no 
matter where it is detected. So, it would not have been possible to analyse the quan-
tum electron field right up until the moment of detection and see that there is a con-
figuration that means that the electron will be detected here rather than there.
There appear to be only two ways in which such experiments, which we have dis-
tributed both in space and in time, can be unpredictable individually and yet be con-
nected through a common pattern, such as the sinc-squared–cosine-squared term in 
this example. The first way is that, in each experiment, the point on the screen where 
the electron is detected is determined randomly, but with the randomness being 
weighted according to the absolute square of the probability amplitude derived 
from summing the Lagrangians of the quantum electron field over time for all pos-
sible trajectories between the electron gun and the detecting screen (see Fig. 4). Of 
course, this is a conventional formulation of quantum mechanics.
However, since this is a probabilistic explanation, it requires a mechanism that 
effectively throws the dice for each experiment. The difficulty with this explanation 
is that no mathematical algorithm or random-number generator can supply the nec-
essary unpredictability, because, by definition, such algorithms are ultimately pre-
dictable. Truly random sequences exist in mathematics, of course, such as the digits 
Fig. 4  The quantum electron field is identical in both experiments, even though there are two different 
outcomes (with the electron being detected at different positions on the screen). Therefore, the outcome 
cannot be predicted from the quantum field
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in a Chaitin halting probability, but such sequences are unknowable in principle—
they cannot be computed—and so cannot be candidates for a random-number gen-
erator. The only exception is random-number generation using quantum processes 
(Herrero-Collantes and Carlos Garcia-Escartin 2017), but that would be a logical 
circularity: you cannot fundamentally explain quantum randomness by saying that it 
is based upon quantum randomness!
Fundamentally, the problem with the probabilistic explanation comes back to 
the block universe: if you picture our universe as a block of spacetime embedded 
throughout with outcomes of quantum interactions, what is it about the underly-
ing pattern of our universe that determines which of the several or many possi-
ble outcomes appears at each embedded interaction? Simply to put it all down to 
probability might at least suggest that the model is incomplete.
The only other way for a pattern to emerge across the individually unpredicta-
ble outcomes of identical experiments widely spread in time and space is through 
a parallel-universe model. A rudimentary example of the particular model used 
in this paper is described in “Appendix 2” as a “Toy Multiverse”. The three key 
features of the parallel-universe model are (1) there is a finite number of dis-
crete, parallel block universes, in contrast to the branching structure of the Many 
Worlds Interpretation (MWI); (2) the universes are independent of each other 
(they do not interact); and (3) their numbers are distributed according to the Born 
probabilities of the quantum outcomes that they each contain.
Hence, for example, in the case of a Stern-Gerlach experiment with two pos-
sible outcomes, one with a 75% chance of occurring and the other with a 25% 
chance of occurring, there are three times as many universes in the multiverse 
containing the high-probability result than there are universes that contain the 
low-probability result. If the same experiment is repeated a million times, this will 
mean that, in the multiverse, most of the universes which feature the sequence of 
a million experiments will contain approximately 750,000 of the high-probability 
results and 250,000 of the low-probability results.
While such a hypothesis may be regarded by some as preposterous in its pleth-
ora of universes, others who accept that our universe is ultimately purely a pat-
tern see no fundamental reason why the pattern may not be repeated, albeit on an 
unimaginable (but always finite) scale.
6  Super‑Reality Within a Mathematical Superstructure
Our definition of reality applies equally to all of the parallel universes. Since each 
universe is independent of the others, each reality is confined to its own universe. 
Hence, in Fig.  4, reality in the block universe containing the quantum electron 
field configuration shown in experiment (a) includes the electron being detected 
to the right of the screen, whereas reality in the block universe containing the 
identical quantum electron field configuration at the moment of detection in 
experiment (b) includes the electron being detected near the centre of the screen.
1 3
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A definition of reality that encompasses parallel block universes is:
Reality (III) Reality within a parallel, block universe is the complete mathematical 
structure of that parallel, block universe.
Equally, since each universe is itself a mathematical structure:
Reality (IV) Reality within a mathematical structure is the complete definition of that 
structure.
To clarify this final statement, an incompletely defined structure would, for exam-
ple, be one in which the value of a function of a parameter can be, say, either one or 
zero, with the actual value being left unspecified. The parallel with quantum uncer-
tainty is clear: there is a unique, definite outcome for every quantum event in our 
block universe, as may be seen when viewing the event in retrospect. The uncer-
tainty arises because such an outcome cannot be determined from the mathematical 
structure: it is unpredictable.
From the above example using parallel universes to account for the outcomes of 
the Stern-Gerlach experiment, the complete pattern, or mathematical structure, of 
any given block universe is apparently not unique. Indeed, since each block universe 
is full of events with two or more possible outcomes, there will be, in general, many 
exact copies of any given block universe. This may be seen by inspecting Eq.  (6) 
and Fig. 13. In that figure, each of the block universes has several exact duplicates, 
and the numbers of such duplicates will increase with the total number of events and 
outcomes in the universes.
As a concrete example of this, consider the three block universes of type i = 2 
shown in Fig. 13, containing outcomes  A2,  C1,  B1. In Fig. 10, the ratios of probabili-
ties of outcomes  C1:C2:C3 are given as 1:3:1. This might lead us to think that there 
is one solitary universe with outcome  C1 and three universes containing outcome 
 C2. However, we see that there are, in fact, three universes of type i = 2 in Fig. 13, 
rather than one solitary universe. If we try to reduce the number of universes in the 
Toy Multiverse by a factor of three, so that the population of type i = 2 is reduced 
to one solitary universe, then the total number in the  A2 branch would also have to 
be reduced from 30 to 10. However, by the same token, the total number in the  A1 
branch would need to come down from 10 to 31∕3 , which fails the requirement that 
the number of universes is necessarily integral. So, in general, there must be a (very 
large) number of indistinguishable copies of any block universe in the multiverse.
Now, the block universe is a unique mathematical structure, just as we observed 
earlier that a sphere, or, for that matter, the sequence of the first hundred prime num-
bers, is a unique mathematical structure. Indeed, the adjective “unique” is superflu-
ous in such a context. If we remember that the block universe is purely a pattern—a 
mathematical structure—then it is just as wrong to regard it as having an indistin-
guishable copy as it is to think of the sequence of primes from 2 to 97 as having an 
indistinguishable copy. The structure is the structure!
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However, the above paragraph is clearly in conflict with the preceding one which 
states that there must generally be many indistinguishable copies of any block uni-
verse in the multiverse. The difficulty arises because we regard each block universe 
as an independent mathematical structure. Deutsch (1997) can claim that the dou-
ble-slit pattern arises from interference between many universes just after branching/
splitting, because quantum interference is a feature of Everett’s MWI formulation. 
However, as stated earlier, the topology of a block universe rules out such branching 
in our model: the mathematical structures of a multiverse of block universes never 
overlap, and are therefore independent of each other, and this includes groups of 
those that are indistinguishable from each other.
The only way for the mathematical structures of the block universes to be unique 
and yet allow for indistinguishable copies of such structures is for all of the struc-
tures to be embedded within a mathematical superstructure. “Appendix 1” clarifies 
our terminology of mathematical structures and superstructures and shows how they 
are related.
In our universe, each quantum field, φi, is a function of location in the block uni-
verse, and we may make this dependence explicit by writing it as 휑i(x, y, z, t) . From 
Eq. (1), our universe U is dependent upon the same parameters: U(x, y, z, t) . Using M 
to represent the mathematical superstructure of our multiverse, its pattern may then 
be written symbolically as
where as is stated in “Appendix 1”, “ ⇒ ” is to be read as “contains the following set 
of embedded structures”. The limit, N, is the total (finite) number of parallel uni-
verses in our multiverse. The reason for considering N as finite is discussed in the 
second paragraph of “Appendix 2”.
As in the Toy Multiverse of “Appendix 2”, there must be at least one parameter θ 
that determines the quantum–mechanical distribution of the N completely independ-
ent universes, Un, embedded in the superstructure of our multiverse.
Equation (4) is effectively the same as Eq. (5) that describes the Toy Multiverse 
of “Appendix 2”, although, in our multiverse, the number N is, of course, unimagi-
nably greater than the 40 universes of the Toy Multiverse. The case for assigning a 
unique set of parameters, 
{
xn, yn, zn, tn
}
 , to each universe, Un, is also more subtle 
than the one we used for the Toy Multiverse. Indeed, the alternative, where all of the 
universes in our multiverse would share a common set of parameters, {x, y, z, t} , was 
actually put forward by Aguirre and Tegmark (2011).
They suggested that the parallel universes (corresponding to our Un) in their 
Level III Multiverse are similar to, or identical copies of, our own Hubble volume, 
distributed far across the cosmos. Their model fails because, as McKenzie argues 
(2017), the eigenstate of any given parallel universe would extend throughout the 
whole cosmos—that is, including regions of space that are receding from each other 
at superluminal speeds. Since this applies to all parallel universes, many of which 
are in mutually orthogonal eigenstates, the scenario of a common set of parameters 
is ruled out because of this potential clash of eigenstates.
Notice that, since the universes Un are embedded within the superstructure, M, it 
is permissible to have duplicate—that is, identical—universes. Duplicate universes 
(4)M(휃)⇒
{
Un
(
xn, yn, zn, tn
)
∶ 1 ≤ n ≤ N
}
1 3
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are identical to each other when viewed from within each one—that is, using only 
the unique set of emergent parameters belonging to each individual universe. (The 
emergent parameters may be regarded as the set of parameters, 
{
xn, yn, zn, tn
}
 , upon 
which each universe, Un, depends.) However, at the level of the superstructure, 
they are distinguishable by their “position” in the superstructure (formally, by the 
parameter(s) θ and the index n that applies to every universe Un).
From the Reality (IV) statement, since each universe, Un, has its own, unique set 
of emergent parameters, 
{
xn, yn, zn, tn
}
 , each universe also has its own, unique real-
ity. Because each set of emergent parameters is unique to each universe, the realities 
within each universe cannot ever “overlap” in any way. However, since the superstruc-
ture M contains all of these parallel universes, they are all part of its reality. In order to 
distinguish between (1) the separate realities of the individual parallel universes, Un, of 
which ours is one; and (2) the reality of the superstructure, M, which is our multiverse, 
it is convenient to use the term super-reality for reality within the superstructure.
It is natural to ask what this super-reality might “look like”. Since we are con-
strained by the emergent parameters of our own universe, then our own universe 
is the only part of the super-reality that we can explore in any depth. There may be 
some limited insight to be gained by asking why super-reality appears to be struc-
tured along quantum–mechanical lines rather than those of any other paradigm. 
However, that approach might just turn out to be equivalent to asking why we were 
born in this century and not 200 years ago.
In the final analysis, no picture of the higher reality can ever be verified by check-
ing it directly. By definition, the vast structure of super-reality that is inaccessible to 
our own universe exists only for that super-reality, lying forever hidden beyond our 
own horizon.
7  Conclusion
In this paper, we support the case proposed by others that our universe is, fundamen-
tally, a pattern, a mathematical structure. This suggests a relatively simple definition: 
reality within a mathematical structure is the complete definition of that structure. 
The idea that our universe is ultimately a pattern may also make it easier to imagine 
the pattern being extended to include a whole multiverse of parallel universes (we 
argue that only such a multiverse can account for the absolute randomness of quan-
tum outcomes).
However, such a picture presents us with a dilemma: in order to account for 
observed probabilities of quantum outcomes, there must be many identical copies of 
universes with particular outcomes. But this means that there must be many identi-
cal copies of particular mathematical structures. The difficulty is that every math-
ematical structure is unique—there cannot be two identical mathematical structures 
any more than there can be two identical sets of the first ten prime numbers—there 
is only one such set. There can be duplicate representations of a set or of a math-
ematical structure, but every structure is unique.
The resolution of the dilemma is that the structure of every parallel universe 
must be embedded within—must be part of—a larger pattern, which we call a 
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mathematical superstructure. This means that there can be groups of identical uni-
verses which can be distinguished from each other (since they occupy different 
“parts” of the pattern of the superstructure). Thus, each universe is unique from the 
perspective of the superstructure (and so the requirement that every mathematical 
structure is unique is not violated) and yet the internal descriptions of each of these 
universes will be identical, which is one of the requirements of the multiverse expla-
nation of measured quantum probabilities.
In “Appendix 1”, we note how sets of parameters can emerge from the process 
of defining a mathematical structure in the simplest possible terms—we call these 
emergent parameters. Each of the parallel universes in the mathematical superstruc-
ture is defined in terms of its own unique set of emergent parameters. The unique-
ness of the emergent parameters in each universe means that there can be no inter-
ference or overlap between universes. However, the superstructure contains all of 
the unique sets of emergent parameters of these individual universes, and so every 
universe is accessible to the superstructure. In addition, the superstructure must con-
tain one or more emergent parameters that are not common to any universe. Such 
parameter(s) allow all of the universes to be distinguished individually, and they 
also, presumably, account for the universes being distributed numerically in such a 
way that leads to the expected ratios of quantum outcomes.
Since the superstructure is a mathematical structure, then the same definition of 
reality applies to it as to the individual parallel universes embedded within it. This 
reality, however, is different from the realities within individual universes. While the 
realities of individual universes can never overlap (since the universes each have a 
different set of emergent parameters), the reality of the superstructure includes the 
reality of every embedded universe (since the superstructure includes all of the dif-
ferent sets of emergent parameters of the embedded universes). For the reality of the 
superstructure, we use the term super-reality.
In the end, we seem to have made a philosophical conundrum for ourselves. We 
have deduced that a mathematical multiverse containing parallel universes must 
exist as a mathematical superstructure. However, since our universe lacks most of 
the parameters (including the emergent parameters of the other universes) that are 
intrinsic to this superstructure, then the vast majority of this superstructure cannot 
be part of our reality. If we regard the concept of reality as synonymous with that 
of existence, then we have effectively proved that the superstructure does not exist, 
despite our earlier conclusion that it does!
Of course, it is a false conundrum, and it may be resolved by adopting a wider 
viewpoint. In Fig. 9, a UTMA is running in the program of each of the five UTMs, 
namely UTM1—UTM5. Each UTMA will deduce, from its narrow viewpoint, that 
the superstructure Game of Life, which is running the five UTMs, does not exist. 
However, from the viewpoint of the superstructure Game of Life, all five of the 
Games of Life embedded within its structure most certainly do exist. From within 
our own universe, the superstructure of the multiverse will remain forever hidden 
below our horizon, and the super-reality will be no more than a metaphysical curios-
ity. If we ever wish to glimpse and understand the super-reality that lies beyond our 
horizon, then we shall have to elevate our perspective accordingly.
1 3
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Appendix 1: Mathematical Superstructures and Super‑Reality
Figure 5 is the binary representation of a number that, written in decimal, would 
contain nearly 1000 digits. In binary, the number contains 3293 bits, and so it can be 
displayed either as an 89 × 37 matrix or a 37 × 89 matrix, with the sequence of bits in 
either case beginning at the top-left corner and ending at the bottom right. We have 
chosen the latter arrangement for the figure.
Let r and s be the number of rows and columns in the matrix, so that r = 37 
and s = 89 in Fig. 5. With this arrangement, the symmetries of the figure are clear, 
and, in particular, two rectangles, each identified by a perimeter of “1”s, stand out 
against a background of “0”s. These features would make it easy to reproduce the 
figure from a simple algorithm based upon r and s. In the case of the alternative 
Fig. 5  This is a 3293-bit binary number with the sequence of bits beginning with the “1” in the top left-
hand corner and finishing in the bottom right-hand corner
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arrangement, where there are no coherent embedded shapes (r = 89 and s = 37), 
the algorithm would be longer.
It is in this way that the parameters r and s may be said to emerge—thus, they 
may be regarded as emergent parameters. In practice, because of the limited 
space on the page, Fig.  5 is so simple that it might be reproduced by an even 
shorter algorithm not based upon r and s. However, for significantly large matri-
ces in which are embedded a greater variety of shapes, the emergent parameters 
become key to the shortest reproducing algorithms.
Shorter algorithms are associated with lower Kolmogorov complexity (Li and 
Vitanyi 2008), and it is in this sense that the parameters r and s emerge naturally.
A characteristic of the type of simple mathematical object displayed in Fig. 5 
is that the space in which smaller objects are embedded (such as the two rec-
tangles) is mutually shared. For instance, if the centres of the two rectangles in 
Fig. 5 had been separated in the s direction by only one bit rather than 29 bits, the 
two rectangles would share some common space.
In contrast, now consider the matrix in Fig. 6. This figure again features a 37 × 89 
matrix representation of a number expressed in 3293 bits, and, again, it contains 
two shapes, this time in the form of two vertical lines of “1”s, each punctuated by 
five strings of three “0”s. If the matrix had been arranged in the alternative 89 × 37 
arrangement, then no such simple embedded shapes would emerge.
Fig. 6  This is a 3293-bit binary number, similar, but not identical, to that in Fig. 5
1 3
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The bits in each vertical line, taken sequentially, are:
which is the 35-bit binary representation of the same number, 33874822719, that 
we encountered earlier. As before, prime-factor parameters p and q emerge naturally 
in this sequence, with p = 7 and q = 5. Notice that, in order to differentiate between 
the emergent parameters of the large matrix, r and s, we have used p and q. To dis-
tinguish between the two separate lines, we may use subscripts for the emergent 
parameters, so that p1 = 7 and q1 = 5 refers, say, to the left-hand line and p2 = 7 and 
q2 = 5 to the right-hand one.
It is necessary to distinguish between the emergent parameters, r, s, of the 3293-
bit number and those of the two 35-bit numbers, p1, q1 and p2, q2, because, unlike 
the rectangles in Fig.  5, the rectangles that are implicit in the embedded lines of 
Fig. 6 do not share the same space as the 37 × 89 matrix. The two lines could be 
drawn adjacent to each other, but the two implicit rectangles would not overlap, 
because the spaces defined by the three sets of emergent parameters, {r, s,}, {p1, q1} 
and {p2, q2}, are all different.
Symbolically, we may write:
where “ ⇒ ” is to be read as “contains the following set of embedded structures”.
A more revealing example is shown in Fig. 7, which is a sketch of the starting 
matrix, generation h = 0, of a Game of Life in which there is not one, but five, UTMs 
of the type shown in Fig. 3.
As before, the Game of Life may be viewed as a stack of matrices, each evolving 
from the previous one according to the Game-of-Life algorithms (2) and (3), and 
represented by State(p, q, h) . The block universe formed from the complete set of 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Matrix(r, s)⇒
{
Rectangle1
(
p1, q1
)
,Rectangle2
(
p2, q2
)}
Fig. 7  Everything within the outer rectangle is a schematic of the starting matrix of a Game of Life fea-
turing five UTMs, each one of which is, itself, running a Game of Life, GoL
1
− GoL
5
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these matrices is shown in Fig. 8, where we have assumed a finite number of genera-
tions, terminating in hmax.
Since a Game of Life is evidently computable as a simulation, it can be computed 
on any of the UTMs in Fig. 8. Therefore, let all four outside UTMs, that is, UTM1, 
UTM2, UTM3 and UTM4, be programmed to simulate identical Games of Life. 
The resulting block Games of Life may be labelled, respectively, GoL1
(
x1, y1, t1
)
 , 
GoL2
(
x2, y2, t2
)
 , GoL3
(
x3, y3, t3
)
 and GoL4
(
x4, x4, t4
)
 . Notice that we have used 
emergent parameters x, y and t in order to distinguish them from those of the Game 
of Life running the five UTMs, p, q and h.
Fig. 8  The cuboid shows a complete Game of Life, played out from its starting configuration at h = 0 to 
the final one at h = hmax. Five UTMs are running in this Game of Life, each programmed with its own 
Game of Life, GoL
1
− GoL
5
Fig. 9  This schematic diagram shows five UTMs, UTM1—UTM5, running within the Game of Life. 
Each of these structures contains, in turn, an embedded Game of Life that features a further UTM (called 
UTMA) and a glider
1 3
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Thus, each of the four outside UTMs will contain the same program data (that is, 
the program for the Game of Life) and the same input data, which will represent the 
pattern (that is, the mathematical structure) in the zeroth-generation matrix of the 
Game of Life.
Now imagine that each of the Games of Life, GoL1 - GoL5 , contains within it 
the instructions for a further UTM of the kind discussed earlier, programmed to 
explore its environment—let us call it a UTMA. Suppose also that the input data 
for each of the four outside UTMs contain, in addition to the UTMA, a solitary 
glider, moving diagonally downwards to the right. Suppose, further, that the central 
UTM—UTM5—is again programmed with the Game of Life featuring a UTMA, 
but that, this time, it also features a solitary glider moving diagonally downwards to 
the left rather than to the right. The block Game of Life for UTM5 may be labelled 
GoL5
(
x5, y5, t5
)
.
The configuration is summarised in Fig. 9.
Of course, the pattern of the Game of Life which each of the UTMs is running, 
including the UTMA and glider, cannot be seen simply by looking at the cuboid 
illustrated in Fig.  8, just as the pattern of Rectangle
(
p1, q1
)
 and Rectangle
(
p2, q2
)
 
cannot be seen by inspecting the 37 × 89 matrix in Fig. 6. The patterns of the Games 
of Life running in the five UTMs are only revealed when they are expressed in their 
emergent parameters 
{
xn, yn, tn
}
.
This is an instance of a general property that, if a mathematical structure, S, con-
tains an embedded structure which can be expressed more simply in its own emer-
gent parameters, then S may be regarded as a mathematical superstructure. Since 
the Games of Life, GoL1 − GoL5 , have emergent parameters that are different from 
those of the Game of Life running them, then the latter is a superstructure.
The embedded Games of Life running in the five UTMs are independent of each 
other—the gliders in the Games of Life running in UTM4 and UTM5 can never col-
lide, with each game being played out independently within the respective emergent 
parameters 
{
x4, y4, t4
}
 and 
{
x5, y5, t5
}
.
So, in the superstructure Game of Life in Fig. 8, there are five independent reali-
ties, one for each of the five Games of Life being played out in the five UTMs. In 
four of these realities, a glider moves diagonally downwards to the right, and in one 
of the realities, the glider moves diagonally downwards to the left.
While the five realities are independent of each other, they are part of the real-
ity of the mathematical superstructure in Fig. 8, which we can call a super-reality. 
The complete mathematical structure of each of the five realities is accessible to that 
super-reality. Symbolically, we may write:
It is in this sense that the Toy Multiverse of “Appendix 2”, in which 40 universes 
are embedded, is considered to be a mathematical superstructure. The super-reality 
of this mathematical superstructure contains, among other things, the 40 mathemati-
cal structures that are parallel universes. The realities intrinsic to these 40 universes 
are completely independent of each other, although they are accessible to the over-
arching super-reality. As well as the 40 parallel universes, we can conclude that the 
State(p, q, h)⇒
{
GoLn
(
xn, yn, tn
)
∶ 1 ≤ n ≤ 5
}
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mathematical superstructure must contain information about the relative probabili-
ties of different quantum outcomes of each of the three quantum events A, B and 
C, in the Toy Multiverse. This is because the relative numbers of these parallel uni-
verses are determined within the mathematical superstructure, and it is these relative 
numbers that determine the quantum probabilities.
Symbolically, we may write:
where θ represents the emergent parameter(s) of the multiverse in which the paral-
lel universes are embedded. We know that the multiverse must contain at least one 
emergent parameter, because the 40 embedded universes make a pattern—a struc-
ture—that follows the rules of quantum mechanics: the frequency distribution of dif-
ferent types of universes is given by Eq. (6). The parameter θ determines the pattern 
of these 40 universes.
Note that, in the above equation, each of the 40 universes, Un, depends upon a set 
of emergent parameters, 
{
xn,yn, zn,tn
}
 which is unique to that universe. The fact that 
each universe must depend upon a set of parameters which is unique to that universe 
may be seen by considering the alternative, where all 40 universes share a common 
set of parameters {x, y, z, t} . In that case, the 40 universes would merge to form a sin-
gle structure—effectively, a single, large universe. So, instead of this enlarged universe 
containing a maximum of three quantum events, which is one of the specifications for 
the model, it would contain 110 quantum events.
Appendix 2: A Toy Multiverse
While Everett’s work was (somewhat sensationally) reinterpreted by DeWitt as invok-
ing parallel universes (DeWitt 1970; DeWitt and Graham 1973), Everett’s main aim 
was to preserve the unitary evolution of the Schrödinger equation without having 
to incorporate wave function collapse. Strictly, the “parallel universes” of the Many 
Worlds Interpretation are, topologically, a single structure that branches at every quan-
tum interaction (“measurement”), and it is this topology that is in conflict with that of a 
block universe, which has no branches. The resolution of this conflict is to replace the 
branches with separate, discrete, parallel filaments (i.e., universes) with the numbers 
of filaments/universes in the branches being proportional to the “thicknesses” of the 
branches (i.e., the Born probabilities of the quantum outcomes that give rise to the indi-
vidual branches) (see, for instance, Figs. 13 and 14). In such a multiverse of separate, 
parallel universes, the Schrödinger equation evolves in exactly the same unitary fash-
ion without recourse to wave function collapse, just as Everett intended in his original 
work.
The features of this model are discussed by McKenzie (2016a). The most impor-
tant of these is that the total number of parallel universes in the multiverse is large but 
finite. This is shown by McKenzie (2016c); essentially, it is because the probability 
of a given outcome of a quantum event is determined by the ratio of the number of 
universes containing that particular outcome to the total number of universes contain-
ing the quantum event. If the numbers of universes in the ratio were infinite, that ratio 
(5)Multiverse(휃)⇒
{
Un
(
xn, yn, zn, tn
)
∶ 1 ≤ n ≤ 40
}
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would be inconsistent and undefined, whereas the measured probabilities of quantum 
outcomes are consistent and well defined. At the same time, assuming that all of the 
branches stem from a common source (so that the parallel universes look increasingly 
similar to each other towards their origins), then ni, which is the number of universes 
of type i, defined by a given set of quantum outcomes, ki , that result from the quantum 
events, ji, is given by
where < ki|ji > is the probability amplitude for quantum event ji to have outcome ki 
in a universe of type i. N is the total number of parallel universes in the multiverse, 
so that
It will be seen from these two equations that N is a free parameter, essentially 
because
(A simple example to make this equation plausible is given by McKenzie (2016c).
We shall return to the question of the value of N, but an illustration may be helpful 
at this point. Consider the case of a simple Toy Multiverse containing a maximum 
(6)ni = N
∏
ji
||< ki|ji >||2
N =
∑
i
ni
∑
i
∏
ji
||< ki|ji >||2 = 1
Fig. 10  This shows the elements of a simple Toy Multiverse. There is a maximum of only three quantum 
events, A, B and C in any of the constituent universes
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of three quantum events, A, B and C, as shown in Fig. 10. Event A has two possible 
outcomes,  A1 and  A2, with occurrence probabilities of 25% and 75% respectively. 
If, and only if, the outcome of event A is  A2, then an event C is triggered. This 
has three possible outcomes,  C1,  C2 and  C3, with occurrence probabilities of 20%, 
60% and 20% respectively. (The outcomes of C may be thought of as representing 
the array of possible outcomes across the detector screen in a two-slit experiment.) 
Event B occurs independently of A and C, and has two possible outcomes,  B1 and 
 B2, each with a 50% probability of occurring.
Figure 11 shows the eight different possible types, i, of universe that can arise 
in this multiverse. A “type” of universe is defined by the particular set of out-
comes arising from the quantum events in that universe. Since the three quantum 
events in the Toy Multiverse, A, B and C, are not entirely independent (event C 
is triggered by outcome  A2), the total number of different types of universe is 
not simply the product of the numbers of outcomes of the three different events, 
2 × 2 × 3, but, instead, is eight, as shown in Fig. 11. For illustration, the symbols ji 
and ki used in the above equations to represent quantum events and the outcomes 
of these events, are shown pointing to event B and outcome  B1 respectively in the 
universe of type 2. Notice that the numbering sequence, i, used to identify the dif-
ferent types of universe, is arbitrary.
We suppose that event B is sufficiently far from event A that the future light 
cone of event B does not reach A’s world line until after event C, which is on A’s 
world line. So, the sequence of outcomes in a universe of type 2, as seen from 
Fig. 11  The eight possible outcomes of quantum events A, B and C are shown in the eight boxes. Each 
box represents a “type” of universe. The outcomes will look different from different perspectives as 
shown in the two vertical strips to the right of the figure
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Fig. 12  Diagram of the same Toy Multiverse of eight different quantum outcomes as seen in two repre-
sentations of the MWI. The differences arise because of the different perspectives of the quantum events 
A and B
Fig. 13  This shows the Toy Multiverse with its eight different types of block universe. Each universe is 
represented by a long, grey filament. The tree structure corresponds to the MWI structure as viewed from 
the perspective of event A
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event A, is  A2,  C1,  B1. This is illustrated at the far right of Fig. 11 as a vertical 
strip with the three events drawn in chronological order, starting from the first 
event at the bottom of the strip. From the vantage point of event B, however, the 
sequence is  B1,  A2,  C1, also shown in a vertical strip in Fig. 11. Notice that both 
versions of the vertical strips are represented by the block universe of type i = 2.
Figure 12 shows how the Toy Multiverse of eight different types of universe 
may be viewed from event A and also from event B. Each tree is effectively a 
multiverse according to the Many Worlds Interpretation. The topologies of the 
two trees are clearly different, although they represent exactly the same events, 
because the branches have to be drawn from a particular viewpoint, and the num-
ber of possible viewpoints increases with the number of events. In this respect, 
the eight types of block universe in Fig. 11 may be regarded as more fundamental 
than the MWI picture, because their structure is independent of any viewpoint. 
This can be more clearly seen by comparing Figs.  13 and 14, which show the 
same eight types of block universe in both MWI structures.
Figure 13 corresponds to the MWI tree in Fig. 12a, where, as described above, 
the branches have been replaced with separate, discrete filaments with each fila-
ment representing one of the eight types of block universe. Figure 14 corresponds 
to the MWI tree in Fig. 12b, and it will be seen that, although the MWI topology 
of the tree is different from that in Fig. 13, it comprises the very same eight block 
universes.
Fig. 14  This shows the Toy Multiverse from an alternative perspective to that in Fig. 13
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A total number of 40 parallel block universes has been used in each of the two 
trees, which is just enough to demonstrate the probability rules. For instance, in 
Fig. 13, the trunk of the tree splits into two branches at event A, with 10 filaments/
universes in the left branch (outcome  A1) and 30 filaments/universes in the right 
branch (outcome  A2). In other words, three times as many universes contain out-
come  A2 as those that contain outcome  A1, which is consistent with the original 
premise that the relative probabilities of outcomes  A1:A2 are 25%:75%.
In Fig. 14, the event A appears twice in the tree, one in each of the two outcome 
branches of event B. Each of these branches contains 20 universes and it will be 
seen that, as in Fig. 13, event A splits into a 25%:75% outcome ratio, with 5 uni-
verses in the  A1 branch and 15 in the  A2 branch.
The total number of universes, N = 40, in these two illustrations is the small-
est we could have used while maintaining the numbers of universes in all of the 
branches needed to produce the specified quantum outcome probabilities. Clearly, 
the total number of universes in the Toy Multiverse can be scaled upwards to any 
multiple of 40, but that raises the question of what to do if the ratio of two quan-
tum outcomes of an event were irrational: for instance, what would be the number 
of universes containing, respectively, the outcomes  A1 and  A2 if the ratio  A1:A2, 
as determined by the Schrödinger equation, were 1/√10 instead of 1∕3?
Evidently, the nature of the pattern of the multiverse (namely, that the number 
of universes in the multiverse is discrete) is not compatible with the continuous 
Schrödinger equation. So, in our hypothesized multiverse, the Schrödinger equa-
tion would need to be rewritten as a digital equation (see, for instance, ’t Hooft 
2014; Zahedi 2016) The fact that no significant difference has been detected 
between measured and calculated quantum probabilities suggests that the num-
ber of parallel universes is large enough to mask any difference, although finding 
an appropriate experiment remains a possible test of the hypothesis (McKenzie 
2016a).
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